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The literature measuring the effects of WTO membership on trade ﬂows has produced remarkably diverse
results. Rose (2004) reports a wide range of empirical speciﬁcations that produce no WTO effects. Tomz et al.
(2007) use Rose's data but include de facto WTO membership, to ﬁnd positive WTO trade effects. Rose (2005)
also produced positive WTO trade effects after accounting for the diverse trade effects produced by individual
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). When Subramanian and Wei (2007) emphasize general equilibrium
trade effects by controlling for multilateral resistance, they ﬁnd strong WTO trade effects only for
industrialized countries. Subramanian and Wei (2007), however, account neither for unobserved
heterogeneity among trading partners, nor for differences in trade effects across PTAs (which could inﬂate
WTO estimates). We unify the Rose, Tomz et al., and Subramanian and Wei speciﬁcations in one
comprehensive approach that minimizes omitted variable bias to show that all speciﬁcations produce one
consistent result: WTO effects on trade ﬂows are not statistically signiﬁcant, while PTAs produce strong but
uneven trade effects. Extending the gravity model to address speciﬁc avenues in which WTO may have
affected trade ﬂows, we ﬁnd that WTO membership boosts trade prior to PTA formation and increases trade
among proximate developing countries (at the expense of distant trade). An augmented gravity model that
accounts for WTO terms-of-trade theory shows that countries with greater incentives to bargain for tariff
reductions before WTO accession experience positive and signiﬁcant subsequent WTO trade effects.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Reductions in trade barriers have been the hallmark of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agree-
ment on Tariff and Trade (GATT).
1 While trade theory holds that tariff
reductions should increase trade ﬂows, the empirical literature on the
effects of WTO membership has produced surprisingly ambiguous
results. Rose (2004) initially documented the absence of WTO effects
on bilateral trade ﬂows. When Tomz et al. (2007, henceforth TGR)
updated Rose's dataset to include both de jure and de facto WTO
membership, they found positive WTO trade effects. Rose (2005) also
produced a positive WTO impact on trade ﬂows, after accounting for
distinct effects of individual preferential trade agreements (PTAs).
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Subramanian and Wei (2007, henceforth SW) then split the global
sample to highlight that WTO trade effects exist for industrialized but
not developing nations. This diversity of results in the empirical WTO
literature seems to suggest that econometric speciﬁcations or data-
coding conventions crucially inﬂuence the magnitude of WTO trade
effects.Aclearunderstandingastowhatdrivesthediversityofresultsis
highly relevant for policy makers and economists alike. Policy makers
needtounderstandifandwhengainsfromWTOcanbeexpected,while
economists seek to resolve whether datasets, coding, or empirical
speciﬁcations drive results.
This paper uniﬁes the above approaches to accessing WTO trade
effects in order to produce four important insights. First, we show that
the literature encompassing Rose, SW, and TGR generates one
consistent result. These speciﬁcations all produce no evidence of
positive WTO trade effects once we control comprehensively for three
sources of omitted variable bias: multilateral resistance, unobserved
bilateral heterogeneity, and individual PTA trade effects. Second,
our robustness analysis shows that once the Rose, SW, and TGR
approaches are uniﬁed, and their results correctly interpreted,
multilateral resistance controls sufﬁce to negate WTO trade effects.
Third, when extending the gravity model to a version more suited to
disentangle overlapping WTO and PTA membership, we ﬁnd that
WTO membership boosts trade effects just before PTA accession and
increases trade among proximate developing countries, albeit at the
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1 Henceforth we use WTO as a synonym for GATT/WTO.
2 See Table A5 in Rose (2005).
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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jieexpense of distant trade. Fourth, we extend the gravity model to
include terms-of-trade theory (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2002),
which is speciﬁcally designed to analyze the effect of WTO member-
ship.Weﬁndthatcountrieswithgreaterincentivestobargainfortariff
reductions during WTO accession negotiations exhibit positive WTO
trade effects.
Our main initial result of no WTO trade effects remains unchanged
even after we account for de facto WTO membership (as TGR suggest),
or when we code the WTO dummy using either the Rose or SW data-
coding conventions.
3 In addition, the results are robust across time
periods, WTO accession dynamics, and alternative types of bilateral
heterogeneity controls. Our paper is the ﬁrst to combine all three
controls (multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity,
and individual PTA trade effects) in a large, bilateral trade dataset to
examine WTO trade effects.
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The three sources of omitted variable bias that we address are
shown to have exerted profound inﬂuence on estimates in the
previous literature. The ﬁrst omitted variable bias ensues when
econometric speciﬁcations include only one average PTA control.
With the exception of Rose (2005), this has been the case in previous
WTO literature. Individual PTA trade effects matter, since preferential
tariff reductions differ vastly across PTAs. When these individual trade
effects are omitted from the empirical approach, the WTO coefﬁcient
may be biasedupwardif it assumespartof a positive,butomitted, PTA
effect. The second omitted variables bias results when general
equilibrium trade effects are not properly accounted for by compre-
hensive multilateral resistance controls as outlined in Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003). Subramanian and Wei (2007) suggest that the
absenceofmultilateralresistancecontrolsin Rose(2004,2005)biased
his WTO results downward. The third potential omitted variable bias
involves unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. In their illustrative
derivation of the gravity model, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) label
the omission of country-pair ﬁxed effects the “gold medal of classic
gravity model mistakes.” The authors derive the associated bias for
coefﬁcients of interest when two countries exhibit unobserved
afﬁnities for bilateral trade before joining a trade agreement (PTA or
the WTO). The omission of country-pair ﬁxed effects then renders
WTO and/or PTA estimates biased upwards.
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The absence of WTO trade effects raises the question of whether
WTOmayfostertradeinmoresubtlewaysthatcannotbeidentiﬁedby
our basic framework unifying the Rose, SW, and TGR approaches. We
extend the gravity framework in two dimensions to allow for speciﬁc
trade effects that are unique to WTO members. The ﬁrst extension
disentangles WTO and PTA trade effects and explores a possible
regional dimension of WTO trade creation. PTA accession is found to
generate positive trade effects for WTO members and non-members
alike. As theory predicts, the magnitude of these PTA trade effects is
stronger for WTO non-members. Meanwhile trade ﬂows between
existing PTA members are hardly affected by WTO accession. There is
evidence, however,thatWTO membership increasedtrade ﬂows prior
to the formation of PTAs. In addition, WTO membership did foster
regional trade integration among developing countries at the expense
of more distant trade.
Our second extension incorporates proxies for the terms-of-trade
theory of WTO, which, unlike the gravity model, has been speciﬁcally
designed to model beneﬁts of WTO membership. The terms-of-trade
theoryhasbeenexpounded ina seriesofpapers byBagwelland Staiger,
who suggest that negotiations through GATT/WTO solve the terms-of-
trade externality. Following Johnson's (1953-4) optimal tariff/retalia-
tion argument, nations may hesitate to implement unilateral tariff
reductions in the absence of WTO. The WTO terms-of-trade theory has
received substantial support from Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming)
and Broda et al. (2008) in smaller datasets. Examining the trade gains
duetoWTOin177nationsover50 years,weﬁndevidenceinsupportof
theterms-of-tradetheory,evenaftercontrollingforthethreesourcesof
omitted variable bias that we discussed above. Speciﬁcally, those
countries that had substantial incentives to negotiate tariff reductions
during their WTO accession negotiations also exhibit signiﬁcantly
larger and positive WTO trade effects than other members, which are
found to exhibit no WTO effects.
The paper is organized as follows. After presenting the data in
Section 2, we unify the Rose, SW, and TGR approaches to WTO trade
effect estimation in a uniﬁed baseline framework and demonstrate
that all these approaches fail to ﬁnd positive WTO trade effects
(Section 3). Section 3 also provides a detailed discussion of the
impacts of PTAs on trade, which are strong but uneven across
individual agreements. Section 4 presents extensive robustness
analysis for our uniﬁed baseline framework. Section 5 extends our
uniﬁed framework in two directions to (i) further disentangle the
effects of WTO and PTA membership and explore regional dimensions
of WTO trade creation and (ii) to proxy for the terms-of-trade theory
of WTO in the gravity model. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
Our data is based on an updated version of SW's unbalanced panel.
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Their bilateral trade values are derived from the IMF's Direction of Trade
Statistics,deﬂatedbytheU.S.consumerpriceindex.Thedatasetfeatures
not only a WTO dummy, but also a dummy that represents
industrialized countries' unilateral trade concessions to developing
trading partners under the GATT/WTO's Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) from 1979 onwards. We adjust the SW dataset to
attribute a value of zero to GSP country-pairs that represent an
industrialized country exporting to a developing country. The reasoning
is that GSP is granted as a unilateral preference (for industrialized
countries' imports from developing countries only). We also identify
Luxembourg as a member of the European Union (EU) in 2000, and
correct other minor coding errors identiﬁed by TGR. These changes do
not affect our or SW's results qualitatively.
SW employ Rose's deﬁnition of de jure WTO membership. However,
TGR indicated that de facto WTO members should also be considered.
To illustrate that WTO trade effects vanish even when accounting for de
facto membership, we use TGR's WTO membership deﬁnition through-
out and refer the interested reader to the working paper version of this
study which features analog results based on de jure WTO membership
(Eicher and Henn, 2008). The conclusions are unaffected by the WTO
membership deﬁnition. A single aggregate PTA indicator dummy has
been prominent in a number of empirical trade ﬂow studies (see e.g.,
Rose, 2000, 2004, 2005; Glick and Rose, 2002, SW, TGR), to capture the
average effect of PTAs on trade ﬂows. We extend the SW dataset and
introduce a more extensive set of PTAs used by Rose (2005) and Eicher
et al. (forthcoming) to properlyaccountfor trade effects ofa largeset of
individual PTAs. Subsequent sections further modify the SW dataset. In
Section 3, we include country-pair ﬁxed effects to control for
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and introduce Rose's (2004, 2005)
3 Rose/TGR coding of trade agreement memberships is mutually inclusive (dummies
identify PTA and WTO memberships), while SW coding is hierarchical, mutually
exclusive (dummies identify either PTA or WTO membership) as discussed in Section 3.
The section also highlights that SW's coding convention is susceptible to producing
biased WTO estimates when (a) industrialized and developing PTAs differ consider-
ably in their trade effects and (b) these PTA effects are constrained to one average PTA
coefﬁcient. We show that in SW's dataset and WTO coding convention, their
signiﬁcantly positive WTO effect for industrialized countries is actually an indus-
trialized country PTA trade effect.
4 Baltagi et al. (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) motivated and included both
multilateral resistance and unobserved heterogeneity controls. They did not examine
WTO membership effects, however.
5 See e.g., Egger (2000), Cheng and Wall (2005), Baltagi et al. (2003) and Baier and
Bergstrand (2007).
6 We use SW's preferred dataset, which excludes observations with import values of
less than $500,000. A list of countries and their year of WTO accession is provided by
Eicher and Henn (2008, Table A3).
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extend the gravity model to account for WTO terms-of-trade theory.
The dimensionality of the dataset remains constant throughout,
with 55,831 observations for 177 countries and 11,797 bilateral trade
pairs in ﬁve year intervals from 1950 to 2000. The power of the
regressions below depends on the number of observations in the
dataset that change WTO membership status. Table A1 provides an
overview of the changes in WTO membership status across country
pairs in the panel. About 3834 changes in WTO status are observed at
the country-pair level, which provides substantial power to the
regressions. The chances of not rejecting the null when the alternative
hypothesis is true are thus low.
3. A uniﬁed baseline framework to minimize omitted variable bias
In this section, we construct a uniﬁed framework from the Rose,
SW, and TGR approaches to WTO trade effect estimation. We
commence by extending SW to account for individual PTA trade
effects to show that their industrialized country WTO effect is actually
an industrialized PTA effect. We then further extend the framework to
incorporate unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls and allow for
the alternative WTO coding convention employed by Rose.
3.1. Accounting for individual PTA trade effects
We begin by extending the gravity framework of SW to fully
account for the impacts of all trade agreements (WTO, GSP, and
individual PTAs). The SW setup has two important characteristics:
ﬁrst, in addition to time ﬁxed effects, Dt, time-varying ﬁxed effects are
introduced for importers, Dmt, and exporters, Dxt,t oc a p t u r e
multilateral resistance (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). Multilateral
resistance can be accounted for with these ﬁxed effects, since any
nation faces only one import/export price index at any point in time.
The inclusion of time-varying importer and exporter effects requires,
however, the dependent variable to be the log of bilateral imports,
Imxt, instead of the commonly used average trade ﬂow variable.
The second important characteristic of SW's approach is their
coding convention. SW code the trade agreement indicator dummies
mutually exclusively to quantify “pure” GSP and WTO trade effects.
SW's key assumption is that a PTA membership “represents the
culmination of trade integration.” Thus SW code trade agreement
indicators such that all trade creation is exclusively attributed to PTAs,
even if both trading partners are currently (or were previously) WTO/
GSP members. For example, if trading partners are members of the
WTO, GSP, and the same PTA, only the PTA dummy takes the value “1”
in SW's coding convention. Coding is hierarchical throughout, so that
when both WTO and GSP dummies could display a “1,” only the GSP
variable takes that value. The “*” superscripts below indicate mutually
exclusive coding.
Our baseline speciﬁcation replicates SW's preferred speciﬁcation
(regression 4 in Table 4 in SW, with the slight differences resulting from
the TGR coding corrections discussed in Section 2).







mxt + δ Zmxt + εmxt
ð1Þ
SW also disaggregate the WTO dummy to identify membership
effects for industrialized and developed nations separately,
WTO_Industrialmxt and WTO_Developingmxt, respectively. Basic OLS
regressionsincludingonly timeﬁxedeffects generate a WTOcoefﬁcient
that represents the average difference in imports for country pairs that
are WTO members vs. country pairs that are not WTO members. The
controls for multilateral resistance also strip the WTO effect of time-
varying effects common to any one importer or exporter.
Inaddition,therowvector,Z mxt,isincluded,whichrepresentsalistof
common gravity controls and proxies for transport costs and geograph-
ic/cultural proximity that are not absorbed by the ﬁxed effects. The list
includes the natural log of bilateral distance, Distancemx,a n dd u m m i e s
for common currency union (CurrencyUnionmxt), contemporaneous or
historical colonial relationships (CurrentColonymxt and EverColonymx),
common colonizer relationships post-1945 (CommonColonizermx),
shared ofﬁcial languages (CommonLanguagemx), and territorial
dependency/contingency (CommonNationmx/Bordermx). Some of the
country-year speciﬁc regressors (for example, importer/exporter
GDP) that can be found in canonical gravity equations are absorbed
into the time-varying importer/exporter ﬁxed effects.
7
Our ﬁrst extension of SW is to modify Eq. (1) by replacing the
aggregate PTA vector, PTAmxt, with dummies that allow each PTA to
account for its own individual effect on bilateral imports. This converts
PTAmxt into a row vector and β1 into a corresponding vector of regression
coefﬁcients that captures the trade impacts of individual PTAs. We
disaggregate the PTA trade effects in two stages. First, we introduce only
PTAs that are already contained in SW's and Rose's (2005) aggregate PTA
dummy.
8 Then we enlarge the set of PTAs to include those suggested by
the recent PTA literature (see Eicher et al., forthcoming).
9 Note that SW's
mutually exclusive coding of trade agreements implies that the
introduction of additional PTAs in this second stage diminishes the
numberof “1”entries inthe WTO variables.Therefore, the introductionof
additionalPTAsmayinﬂuencetheWTO/GSPestimatesfortworeasons:a)
by allowing individual PTAs to correct for omitted variable bias, and b) by
reducing the WTO entries of PTA observations to “zero.” If omitted PTAs
are strongly trade creating and PTA members have also joined the WTO,
the WTO coefﬁcient in SW would be expected to be biased upward.
Before we discuss results, it is important to recall that SW's
hierarchical coding convention assumes that PTA membership “repre-
sents the culmination of trade integration.” Thus the SW PTA regression
coefﬁcients include the WTO effect. To compare results to the standard
Rose coding method, we report SW PTA coefﬁcients net of WTO trade
effectsinTable1a.
10Regressions2and3reportresultsforSW'ssetupwith
the addition of individual PTA effects that we have added. The data
corrections discussed in Section 2 increase the WTO and PTA coefﬁcients
slightly, but SW's original results are robust. Only industrialized countries
are shown to beneﬁt from WTO membership in regression 1 through a
trade increase of 187% (=e
1.053−1), while developing countries
experience no WTO effect. With the exception of a common border and
same nation status, all regressors that control for observable bilateral
heterogeneity are highly signiﬁcant, and they remain so throughout.
Regression 1 also indicates a highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient associ-
ated with the aggregate PTA dummy in the original SW speciﬁcation.
The “pure” PTA effect, net of any WTO trade effects, is provided in
Table 1a, regression 1 for industrialized and developing countries. Here
we ﬁnd that bilateral trade increases at a dramatically different rate for
industrialized and developing country PTA members. Industrialized
7 To obtain coefﬁcients for the absorbed regressors, see Hsiao (1986, p. 50 f.) or
Hausman and Taylor (1981).
8 These are: ASEAN Free Trade Area, AFTAmxt, the Australia-New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations Trade Agreement, ANZCERTAmxt, the Central American Common
Market, CACMmxt, the Caribbean Community/Carifta, CARICOMmxt, the European Union
(and its predecessor agreements), EUmxt, the Southern Cone Common Market,
MERCOSURmxt, the North America Free Trade Agreement, NAFTAmxt, the South Paciﬁc
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, SPARTECAmxt, and bilateral
PTAs, BilateralPTAmxt.
9 Additional PTAs are: Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Community, APECmxt, the Andean Pact,
APmxt, the European Economic Area, EEAmxt, the European Free Trade Association,
EFTAmxt, and the Latin America Integration Agreement/Lafta, LAIAmxt. For a list of trade
agreements and when countries entered, see Eicher and Henn (2008).
10 Net PTA effects in Table 1a can be compared to Rose's Table 2 by subtracting WTO
coefﬁcients in Table 1b from the gross PTA coefﬁcients in Table 1b using the Delta
Method (e.g., Greene, 2003).
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0.152−1) while
trade in developing countries increases 214% (=e
1.143−1).
Regression 2 allows for individual PTA trade effects. We ﬁnd that all
multilateral trade dummies are heavily impacted, conﬁrming the
suspicion of potential upward bias in regression 1. Most notably, we
ﬁndthattheeconomicandstatisticalsigniﬁcanceofWTOmembershipfor
industrialized countries is reduced by an order of magnitude. WTO-
induced trade creation for industrialized countries falls from 187% in
regression 1 to 80% (=e
0.588−1) in regression 2. This suggests that the
sizable trade creation that was attributed to WTO membership in
regression 1 is more accurately associated with individual PTAs. The
precision of the individual PTA estimates together with the F-Statistic
(which rejects regression 1 in favor of regression 2) suggests that
regression 1 suffers from omitted variable bias.
The individual PTAs are all trade creating and highly statistically
signiﬁcant (with the exception of the EU, a case we discuss at length
Table 1a
WTO and PTA Trade Effects. (Hierarchical, mutually exclusive coding.)
Dependent variable: bilateral imports
Regression # 1 1a 2 3 4 5 6
Estimation method MLR MLR MLR MLR MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE
WTO dummy coding SW SW SW SW SW SW SW
WTO membership deﬁnition TGR TGR TGR TGR TGR TGR TGR
Adj R
2 0.7411 0.7411 0.7415 0.7430 0.8747 0.8751 0.8760
F stat vs. regression # # 1 # 1 # 2 # 4 # 3
ProbNF: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GSPmt (ind. importer grants) −0.209 *** −0.209 *** −0.202 *** −0.202 *** −0.242*** −0.233*** −0.181 ***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047)
WTO_Developingmt 0.062 0.062 −0.045 −0.235*** 0.210 −0.207 −0.254***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.131) (0.075) (0.147) (0.148) (0.082)
WTO_Industrialmt 1.053 *** −0.152 *** 0.588 *** −0.035 0.393 ** 0.124 −0.068
(0.141) (0.056) (0.195) (0.092) (0.165) (0.189) (0.092)
PTA_Indmxt (based on aggregate in Table 1b) 0.152 *** 0.361 ***
(0.056) (0.055)





Bilateral_PTA_Indmxt 0.072 0.351*** −0.169 * −0.054
(0.109) (0.085) (0.101) (0.084)
Bilateral_PTA_Devmxt 0.705 *** 0.551 *** 0.161 * 0.132 *
(0.085) (0.080) (0.086) (0.180)
NAFTA_Indmxt 1.529 *** 1.276 *** 0.155 0.257
(0.188) (0.161) (0.139) (0.169)
NAFTA_Devmxt 2.162 *** 1.476 *** 0.485 *** 0.443 **
(0.216) (0.172) (0.158) (0.176)
EUmxt 0.065 −0.139 ** 0.473 *** 0.306 ***
(0.056) (0.067) (0.062) (0.068)
CACMmxt 1.346 *** 1.509 *** 1.907 *** 1.938 ***
(0.191) (0.173) (0.253) (0.242)
CARICOMmxt 1.437 *** 1.446 *** 1.071 *** 1.070 ***
(0.143) (0.143) (0.253) (0.253)
MERCOSURmxt 1.530 *** 1.552 *** 0.982 *** 1.068 ***
(0.197) (0.202) (0.227) (0.243)
AFTAmxt 0.568*** 0.391** −0.035 0.049
(0.159) (0.172) (0.196) (0.207)
ANZCERTAmxt 1.875 *** 1.647 *** 0.747 ** 0.770 ***
(0.123) (0.135) (0.293) (0.297)
SPARTECA_Indmxt 0.824 *** 1.238 *** 0.587 *** 0.742 ***
(0.236) (0.224) (0.207) (0.178)
SPARTECA_Devmxt 1.457 *** 1.438 *** 0.917 *** 0.927 ***
(0.210) (0.217) (0.176) (0.170)
EFTAmxt 0.491 *** 0.200 ***
(0.091) (0.075)
EEAmxt 0.508 *** 0.342 ***
(0.096) (0.105)
APmxt 0.638 *** 0.677 ***
(0.183) (0.223)




APEC_Devmxt 0.851 *** 0.293 ***
(0.070) (0.079)
Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. GSP and PTA coefﬁcients are net of WTO effects, see footnote 10. All regressions include time ﬁxed
effects. Fixed effects results are not reported. MLR indicates multilateral resistance controls, i.e. time-varying importer and exporter ﬁxed effects. CPFE indicates unobserved bilateral
heterogeneity controls, i.e. country-pair ﬁxed effects. Additional regressors not reported include all common gravity variables discussed in the text (Eq. (1)). All these regressors are
signiﬁcant at the 1% level throughout, except common nation and border. Full results are available from the authors upon request.
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trade creation implied by the estimates varies dramatically from 770%
(=e
2.162−1) for NAFTA to 76% (=exp
0.568−1) for the ASEAN free trade
agreement(AFTA).Regression3controlsforadditionalPTAsthatwerenot
included in SW (or Rose, 2005), but feature prominently in the empirical
PTA literature.
11 EFTA, EEA, LAIA, and APEC are all shown to be highly
trade creating. Once we account for the individual PTA trade effects with
the most comprehensive set of PTAs, we ﬁnd that SW's result of positive
WTO trade effects in industrial countries vanishes.
Allowing for individual PTA trade effects also generates seemingly
bleak insights for developing countries. The effects of WTO member-
ship are estimated to be either nonexistent (regressions 1 and 2) or
negative and statistically signiﬁcant (−21%=e
−0.235−1 in regres-
sion 3). On the upside, however, PTA coefﬁcients indicate strong trade
creation for all PTAs involving developing countries.It may well be the
case that developing countries reoriented their import activity
considerablytowardsPTApartnersafterjoiningPTAs;wewillexamine
the robustness of this result below. The largest levels of trade creation
inregression3areobservedforPTAsthatconsistofdevelopingnations
(CACM, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, NAFTA-Developing and SPARTECA-
Developing)wherePTA-internaltradeisestimatedtoberoughly350%
(=e
1.5−1) greater than PTA-external trade.
3.2. “Industrialized WTO” and “industrialized PTA” trade effects
Our results above suggest that PTA trade creation is not homoge-
neous across agreements. To the contrary, bilateral PTA trade is
estimated to be signiﬁcantly larger for PTAs that consist of developing
countries than for industrialized trading partners that belong to the
same PTA. Ignoring such differentials in trade creation introduces a
speciﬁc type of omitted variable bias into SW style regressions. This
section discusses this bias and outlines its impact on SW's key
parameter: the industrialized country WTO coefﬁcient. SW's results
are easily misinterpreted due to their coding convention. We will show
that their coding convention, together with their ﬁxed effects
speciﬁcation generates an “implicit industrialized PTA” dummy. This
dummy is the result of the interaction between a) SW's mutually
exclusive coding convention, b) multilateral resistance controls (time-
varying importer dummies), and c) the nature of industrialized
countries' WTO/PTA accession in this particular dataset.
Since all industrialized importers in the dataset joined the WTO
before joining a PTA, SW code either the PTA dummy or the
industrialized WTO/GSP dummy as "1" for years after industrialized
importers joined a PTA. As a result, the linear combination of these
two dummies is perfectly collinear with industrialized countries'
time-varying importer dummies. This led SW to mislabel the
industrial countries' PTA effect as a industrial countries' WTO effect.
To highlight the issue, we perform a quick experiment. Regression 1a
partitions SW's aggregate PTA dummy into two separate effects: one
for industrialized importers and another for developing importers
featuring PTA relationships. The experiment results in perfect multi-
collinearity between the industrialized WTO dummy and the
industrialized PTA dummy, forcing one or the other to be dropped
from the regression. A comparison of regressions 1 and 1a (Table 1a)
thenrevealsthatthe“industrializedWTO”dummyinSW'sregression1
is actually an “industrialized PTA” effect, with only the signs reversed
because of SW's coding convention.
3.3. Accounting for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity
The PTA literature has long considered various PTA estimates (such
as AP, LAIA and APEC) as suspiciously high, relative to the small tariff
reductions associated with these agreements (e.g. Frankel, 1992;
Frankel and Wei, 1993; Frankel et al., 1995; Frankel, 1997). There exists
substantial evidence, however, that trade agreements tend to form
between trading partners whose bilateral trade has been “naturally”
elevated all along, due to unobserved characteristics (see e.g. Baier and
Bergstrand,2007).Thisraisestheriskofincorrectlyattributing“natural”
trade-promoting characteristics to trade agreements. SW attempted to
control for such country-pair speciﬁc characteristics with the inclusion
of a number of control variables contained in the vector Z above.
However, the resulting WTO and PTA coefﬁcients are biased upwards,if
the included controls do not account for all bilateral heterogeneity, for
instance because some is unobserved.
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) and Cheng and Wall (2005)
previously conﬁrmed that implausibly large estimates can be lowered
by accounting for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity (neither study
includes GSP or WTO trade effects). To fully account for all time-
invariant bilateral heterogeneity in Eq. (1), we follow the previous
literature and replace the intercept in Eq. (1) with a country-pair
speciﬁc dummy, Dmx:








+ δ2CurrentColonymxt + εmxt:
ð2Þ
Eq. (2) features fewer explanatory variables than Eq. (1) because
all time-invariant regressors are now absorbed into the pair-speciﬁc
ﬁxed effects. When country-pair ﬁxed effects are added, the WTO
trade effect is also stripped of any average, time-invariant effect
between trading partners.
Regressions 4–6i nTable 1a present analogs of regressions 1–3
above. The only differences are the added country-pair speciﬁc ﬁxed
effects that constitute comprehensive controls for unobserved
bilateral heterogeneity. Two areas are the focus of our interest: a)
whether WTO trade effects are inﬂuenced by unobserved bilateral
heterogeneity, and b) whether PTA trade effects are reduced to
plausible ranges. Regression 4 replicates the original SW speciﬁcation
(regression 4 in SW Table 4) with the addition of country-pair ﬁxed
effects.
The results show a substantial reduction of the WTO's economic
and statistical signiﬁcance for industrialized countries. WTO trade
creation falls from 178% in regression 1 to 48% (=e
0.393−1) for
industrialized countries in regression 4, and its statistical signiﬁcance
is reduced to the 5% level. The inclusion of speciﬁc PTA trade effects in
regressions 5 and 6 again negate all WTO trade effects for
industrialized countries. Regression 5 even shows that the simple
disaggregation of SW's own PTA dummy is sufﬁcient to neutralize any
industrialized WTO trade effects, once we account for heterogeneity
in bilateral relationships. For developing countries, in sharp contrast,
regressions 4–6 illustrate that the GSP and WTO trade effects are
hardly impacted by unobservable heterogeneity. Their estimates are
closely aligned with those in regressions 1–3.
The F statistics conﬁrm the importance of the inclusion of
comprehensive country-pair ﬁxed effects, and individual (in lieu of
aggregate)PTAtradeeffectsatsigniﬁcancelevelsexceeding0.001%.The
added controls also generate reduced (and more plausible) trade
impacts for individual PTAs. This provides evidence that unobserved
bilateral heterogeneity is generally trade-enhancing. Average trade
creation across PTAs drops from 234% in regression 1 to 123% in
regression 4 (Table 1b). Most individual trade agreements see their
trade effects at least halved in regressions 5 and 6. In contrast, trade
creation in the EU increases, and the EU coefﬁcient is now estimated
11 For our broadest PTA set, 3253 of the 55,813 observations are country pairs that
are also members of a common PTA. Of these 3253 observations, 2700 of the importers
are also contemporaneous WTO members.
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Section 3.5, when we examine the individual PTA trade effects in detail.
The expanded SW results in regressions 1–6 give rise to the
question whether the absence of WTO trade effects may be an artifact
of the hierarchical, mutually exclusive coding in SW. As discussed
above, when increases in trade ﬂows are attributed to PTAs rather
than to both, WTO and PTA memberships, one may suspect that the
SW coding convention underestimates WTO trade effects. More
problematically, the industrialized WTO effect is actually an implicit
“industrialized PTA” effect, given the structure of the data. In the next
section, we apply the more conventional, mutually inclusive WTO
coding (as in Rose, 2004) to allow for separate identiﬁcation of WTO
and PTA trade effects. This analysis has two purposes. Not only will it
settle whether the SW coding convention is driving the results, but it
is also a substantive extension of Rose (2004, 2005), because we
extend his speciﬁcation to introduce both disaggregate PTAs as well as
comprehensive multilateral resistance controls.
3.4. Accounting for Alternative WTO Coding Conventions
Rose (2004, 2005) controlled for unobserved bilateral heteroge-
neity through country-pair ﬁxed effects, but SW noted that Rose did
not include the most comprehensive multilateral resistance controls.
By introducing comprehensive controls for multilateral resistance to
Rose's dataset, we unify the SW and Rose approaches. Our approach
controls for all three key determinants of trade under both coding
conventions: unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, multilateral resis-
tance,and individual PTA trade effects. The uniﬁed approachallowsus
to highlight whether any results are due to mutually inclusive (Rose)
or mutually exclusive (SW) coding of WTO dummies. To allow for a
comparison between Rose and SW coding results, we split Rose's
inclusive WTO-dummy into SW-style indicators for industrialized and
developing importers' WTO membership.
An exact comparison between Rose's standard coding convention
and SW can be achieved by simply reproducing regressions 1–3 with
mutually inclusive coding.







mxt + δ Zmxt + εmxt
ð1′Þ
Eq. (1′) is essentially Rose's speciﬁcation with multilateral
resistance controls. The only difference between Eqs. (1) and (1′) is
Table 1b
Background results for Table 1a. This table reports the raw regression output for SW's mutually exclusive coding convention. Mutually exclusive coding implies that GSP and PTA
coefﬁcients include WTO Effects. The effects for all regressors net of WTO effects are reported in Table 1a.
Dependent variable: bilateral imports
Regression # 1 1a 2 3 4 5 6
Estimation method MLR MLR MLR MLR MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE
GSPmt (ind. importer grants) 0.844 *** −0.360*** 0.385 ** −0.237 ** 0.151 −0.110 −0.249 ***
(0.142) (0.115) (0.194) (0.093) (0.166) (0.187) (0.095)
WTO_Developingmt 0.062 0.062 −0.045 −0.235 *** 0.210 −0.207 −0.254 ***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.131) (0.075) (0.147) (0.148) (0.082)
WTO_Industrialmt 1.053 *** −0.152 *** 0.588 *** −0.035 0.393 ** 0.124 −0.068
(0.141) (0.056) (0.195) (0.092) (0.165) (0.189) (0.092)





Bilateral_PTAmxt 0.660 *** 0.316 *** −0.045 −0.122
(0.164) (0.095) (0.167) (0.097)
NAFTAmxt 2.117 *** 1.241 *** 0.279 0.189
(0.258) (0.148) (0.215) (0.152)
EUmxt 0.652 *** −0.174 * 0.596 *** 0.238 **
(0.199) (0.097) (0.196) (0.107)
CACMmxt 1.301 *** 1.274 *** 1.700 *** 1.684 ***
(0.168) (0.166) (0.244) (0.239)
CARICOMmxt 1.391 *** 1.211 *** 0.864 *** 0.817 ***
(0.209) (0.165) (0.288) (0.264)
MERCOSURmxt 1.485 *** 1.317 *** 0.776 *** 0.814 ***
(0.246) (0.198) (0.271) (0.233)
AFTAmxt 0.523 *** 0.156 −0.241 −0.204
(0.188) (0.154) (0.237) (0.194)
ANZCERTAmxt 2.463 *** 1.612 *** 0.870 ** 0.702 **
(0.227) (0.132) (0.347) (0.295)
SPARTECAmxt 1.412 *** 1.203 *** 0.710 *** 0.674 ***
(0.199) (0.207) (0.178) (0.164)
EFTAmxt 0.455 *** 0.132
(0.122) (0.114)
EEAmxt 0.472 *** 0.275 ***
(0.069) (0.065)
APmxt 0.404 ** 0.423 **
(0.166) (0.214)
LAIAmxt 0.032 1.023 ***
(0.110) (0.185)
APECmxt 0.616 *** 0.039
(0.090) (0.098)
Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include time ﬁxed effects. Fixed effects results are not reported. MLR indicates
multilateral resistance controls, i.e. time-varying importer and exporter ﬁxed effects. CPFE indicates unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls, i.e. country-pair ﬁxed effects.
Additional regressors not reported include all common gravity variables discussed in the text (Eq. (1)). All these regressors are signiﬁcant at the 1% level throughout, except Common
Nation and Border. Full results are available from the authors upon request.
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superscripts.
12 The WTO dummy is again disaggregated to identify
membership effects for industrialized and developed nations,
WTO_Industrialmxt
** and WTO_Developingmxt
** ,asw el lasfo rGSPmxt
** trading
partners. Crucial is that under Rose's coding convention both WTO
and GSP variables take on the value “1” when the two conditions are
fulﬁlled. In addition, when the same trading partners are members in
a common PTA, mutually inclusive coding assigns the value “1” to all
three dummies. For comparison purposes, it is important to point
out that inclusive coding delivers coefﬁcient estimates that represent
pure PTA trade effects. There is no need to produce net effects via the
Delta method as in the SW case.
We proceed again in stages. First we provide results based on
Eq. (1′), and then we add country-pair ﬁxed effects to control for all
time-invariant bilateral heterogeneity. Inclusion of country-pair
effects again converts the constant a0 to a pair-speciﬁc one, Dmx:







mxt + δ1Currency Unionmxt
+ δ2CurrentColonymxt + εmxt:
ð2′Þ
Regression 7 in Table 2 establishes a baseline regression that
represents our closest analog to Rose's preferred regressions (Table 1
in Rose, 2004). It represents a robustness test of Rose's ﬁndings that
examines whether comprehensive accounting for multilateral resis-
tanceaffectshis originalresults. Regression7alsoprovides a robustness
12 Strictly speaking, there exists one additional discrepancy between mutually
inclusive and exclusive coding of multilateral trade agreements. Mutually exclusive
coding assigns a “1” to any WTO importer (without PTA or GSP relationship), while
inclusive coding assigns a “1” only when both importer and exporter are WTO
members. The reason is the collinearity between inclusive WTO-dummies and
multilateral resistance controls. Speciﬁcally, the inclusive WTO dummy takes the
value “1” for all observations that relate to a member countries' trade in a given year,
which establishes collinearity with the importer-year dummy that controls for
multilateral resistance. By construction, this collinearity is avoided in mutually
exclusive coding since WTO importers are not considered WTO members when the
WTO importer is in a PTA or GSP relationship with the exporter.
Table 2
WTO and PTA trade effects. (Inclusive coding.)
Dependent variable: bilateral imports
Regression # 7 8 9 10 11 12
Estimation method MLR MLR MLR MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE
WTO dummy coding Rose Rose Rose Rose Rose Rose
WTO membership deﬁnition TGR TGR TGR TGR TGR TGR
Adj R
2 0.7401 0.7415 0.7431 0.8747 0.8751 0.8760
F stat vs. regression # # 7 # 8 # 7 # 8 # 10 # 9 # 11
ProbNF: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GSPmxt (ind. importer grants) −0.127 *** −0.183 *** −0.181 *** −0.252 *** −0.228 *** −0.187 ***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
WTO_Developingmxt −0.103 −0.118 * −0.109 * −0.051 −0.054 −0.035
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
WTO_Industrialmxt 0.058 0.069 0.071 −0.028 −0.026 −0.002
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066)
PTAmxt 0.629 *** 0.473 ***
(0.052) (0.045)
Bilateral_PTAmxt 0.453 *** 0.470 *** 0.070 0.059
(0.069) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068)
NAFTAmxt 1.755 *** 1.194 *** 0.323 ** 0.150
(0.145) (0.153) (0.155) (0.171)
EUmxt 0.072 −0.146 ** 0.506 *** 0.312 ***
(0.056) (0.064) (0.060) (0.068)
CACMmxt 1.316 *** 1.372 *** 1.788 *** 1.789 ***
(0.163) (0.164) (0.238) (0.238)
CARICOMmxt 1.447 *** 1.454 *** 1.065 *** 1.061 ***
(0.144) (0.143) (0.254) (0.254)
MERCOSURmxt 1.540 *** 1.402 *** 0.984 *** 0.879 ***
(0.197) (0.196) (0.228) (0.229)
AFTAmxt 0.551 *** 0.189 −0.043 −0.161
(0.156) (0.154) (0.195) (0.194)
ANZCERTAmxt 1.877 *** 1.514 *** 0.747 ** 0.623 **
(0.124) (0.124) (0.292) (0.291)
SPARTECAmxt 1.310 *** 1.350 *** 0.814 *** 0.807 ***
(0.206) (0.208) (0.168) (0.167)
EFTAmxt 0.473 *** 0.199 ***
(0.091) (0.075)
EEAmxt 0.489 *** 0.294 ***
(0.067) (0.069)
APmxt 0.385 ** 0.424 *
(0.167) (0.217)
LAIAmxt 0.189 * 1.190 ***
(0.098) (0.182)
APECmxt 0.798 *** 0.244 ***
(0.063) (0.071)
Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include time ﬁxed effects. Fixed effects results are not reported. MLR indicates
multilateral resistance controls, i.e. time-varying importer and exporter ﬁxed effects. CPFE indicates unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls, i.e. country-pair ﬁxed effects.
Additional regressors not reported include all common gravity variables discussed in the text (Eq. (1)). All these regressors are signiﬁcant at the 1% level throughout, except common
nation and border. Full results are available from the authors upon request.
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whether results are affected by the coding convention.
Rose's preferred regressions report insigniﬁcant WTO trade effects
throughout. The insertion of multilateral resistance controls does not
change Rose's conclusions regarding WTO trade effects. Regression 7
shows that trade creation due to WTO membership for both industri-
alizedand developingcountriesisinsigniﬁcant.Evenwhentheindustrial
and developing country WTO dummies in regression 7 are aggregated to
one WTO dummy, the effect remains insigniﬁcant (see Table 5,
regression 13). The only change is that Rose's GSP effect is eliminated.
A comparison of regressions 1a and 7 highlights that coding
conventions do not drive our key conclusion. Both mutually inclusive
and exclusive coding conventions render the WTO effect statistically
and economically insigniﬁcant. In Rose-style mutually inclusive
coding, this is more immediately apparent, because PTA coefﬁcients
provide net effects: hence the industrialized WTO dummy cannot
function as an error-correction term. Under mutually inclusive coding
it is not possible for a WTO dummy to implicitly split the aggregate
PTA variable into North–North PTAs (with lower net trade creation)
and South–South PTAs (with higher net trade creation) as in the case
of mutually exclusive coding above. As a result, mutually inclusive
coding in Table 2 can never deliver signiﬁcant WTO coefﬁcients.
The signiﬁcant WTO coefﬁcient in SW was only signiﬁcant because
mutually exclusive coding produced PTA coefﬁcients that include both
PTAandWTOtradeeffects.Giventhestructureofthedatathisimpliesthat
the industrialized WTO effect was actually an industrialized PTA effect.
Hence we point to the important insight that the net effect generated by
mutuallyinclusivecodingsigniﬁcantlyreducestheriskofomittedvariable
bias. Mutually exclusive coding, on the other hand, holds the danger that
WTO dummies are biased when the following two conditions are met:
(1) industrialized and developing PTAs differ considerably in their trade
effects and (2) individual PTA trade effects are constrained to an average
coefﬁcient associated with one aggregate PTA dummy.
Regressions 8 and 9 (the inclusive-coding analogs of regressions 2
and 3) introduce individual PTA trade effects and represent two further
robustnesstests.TheﬁrsttestiswhetherRose's(2005)resultsofasmall,
positive WTO effect are robust to controlling for multilateral resistance.
Atthesametime,regressions8and9representasecondrobustnesstest
that examines whether SW's WTO effect vanishes only because of their
codingconvention.Regressions8 and 9overturn Rose's(2005) result of
a statistically signiﬁcant WTO effect when individual PTA trade effects
are considered. Hence Rose's (2005) ﬁnding of small (but signiﬁcant)
WTO trade effects came about only because he did not control
comprehensively for multilateral resistance. The regressions that
allow for individual PTA trade effects also highlight that the vanishing
WTOeffectinSW–afterwecontrolledforindividualPTAtradeeffects–
wasindeedonlyduetoSW'shierarchicalandmutuallyexclusivecoding.
Regressions 10–12 are the mutually inclusively coded analogs to
regressions 4–6. With inclusive coding we ﬁnd no WTO trade effects in
these regressions. Regression 12 represents our preferred speciﬁcation,
since it features the more reliable coding convention and contains all
threekeycontrols:multilateralresistance,naturaltradingpartnereffects,
and individual PTA trade effects. It conﬁrms the absence of signiﬁcant
WTO trade gains. The validity of this regression is also established by the
F-statistics: without exception we ﬁnd that the inclusion of individual
PTA trade effects always improves the estimation no matter which set of
controls is selected.
3.5. Trade effects of individual PTAs
Examining WTO trade effects while controlling for individual PTA
trade effects along with the most comprehensive set of ﬁxed effects,
raises the question how our PTA results compare to the voluminous
literature on PTA effects on trade ﬂows. We focus on our preferred
speciﬁcation, regression 12. The PTA coefﬁcients in regression 12
indicate how much PTA-internal trade increased relative to trade with
non-members for a typical importer/exporter pair. Hence, even
insigniﬁcant PTA estimates do not imply that the PTA was necessarily
ineffective in creating trade ﬂows, only that PTA-internal trade grew
at the rate of external trade. Note also that Anderson and van
Wincoop's (2003) multilateral resistance renders trade creation and
diversion indistinguishable, so that our results below refer to the sum
of trade creation and diversion.
13
The individual trade effects of PTAs in regression 12 are the most
“reasonable” among all our regressions, in the sense that the net trade
creation for most PTAs is estimated to range between 30% and 80%.
Curiously, the Central and Latin American Trade Agreements (CACM,
CARICOM, MERCOSUR and LAIA) show the largest increases in relative
trade. These are also the only PTAs that report net increases in trade
creation of over 100% (with the exception of SPARTECA, which reports
an increase of 124%=e
0.807−1). Note, however, that with the
exception of LAIA, the implied trade effects are all lower than in the
original Rose or SW speciﬁcations in Tables 1a and 2.
Most notable is the reduction in the estimated net trade creation
formostPTAs,after wecontrolforunobservedbilateralheterogeneity.
Comparingregressions9 and12revealsthat,withtheexceptionofthe
EU, CACM and LAIA, all PTA estimates are substantially reduced when
we include country-pair ﬁxed effects. In other words, our results
suggest strongly that PTAs are formed between countries that have
been sharing characteristics favorable to mutual trade all along. In this
case, tariff reduction may simply be an afterthought. Controlling for
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity also improves the precision of the
estimates in all cases but NAFTA. The suspiciously large net trade
creation of NAFTA (230%) in regression 9 is reduced to insigniﬁcance
after we control for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity.
Controlling for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity also increased
trade creation for three PTAs (EU, EFTA and CACM). Given these PTA
member countries' characteristics, their actual trade ﬂows are not large
enough relative to the prediction of the gravity model. For example, in
thecaseofCACM,allcountriesshareacommonlanguage,colonizer,and
proximity. The introduction of country-pair ﬁxed effects resolves the
systematic overprediction of the gravity model in this case and allows a
better assessment of the impact of PTA accession. The fact that the EU
trade impact is underestimated in both the traditional and multilateral
resistance-augmented versions of the gravity equation is well known
(e.g., Aitken, 1973; Rose, 2004). Our estimates show a statistically
signiﬁcant37%(=e
0.312−1)increaseintradeduetoEUaccession,once
we control for unobserved bilateralheterogeneity. In thecase of theEU,
it is likely that the large market and the strong harmonization efforts
allowed ﬁrms to overcome trade ﬁxed costs that subsequently led to
strong trade creation between both member and non-member
countries (e.g. Freund, 2000; Melitz, 2003). The increase in absolute
trade volume among EU members that we observe seems then
reasonably small compared to trade increases with non-members. It is
alsoimportanttonotethatourestimatesimplythatEUmembersreaped
another 34% trade beneﬁt when they became EEA members in 1994.
Another trade agreement that has been the subject of great interest
in the PTA literature is APEC. Highly signiﬁcant and truly exorbitant
APECtradecreationestimates(around300%)havebeencommoninthe
gravity literature, although APEC is only a forum without implications
for tariffs (see e.g. Frankel and Wei, 1993; Frankel et al., 1995; Frankel,
1997). Regression 9 indicates that the inclusion of multilateral
resistance lowers values for the APEC coefﬁcient substantially to 123%
(=e
0.802−1). The inclusion of unobserved bilateral heterogeneity
controls shows that much of the trade creation originally attributed to
13 Multicollinearity does not allow for separate trade creation/diversion effects in the
presence of multilateral resistance controls. For a given year, a typical PTA member
country's import observations are partitioned into imports originating from (a) fellow
PTA members, and (b) non-members. The linear combination of these two dummy
variables is perfectly collinear with the time-varying importer dummies that control
for multilateral resistance.
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suspicionofFrankelandcoauthorsallalong,theirquesttoidentifythese
unobservable drivers has largely been unsuccessful. In our preferred
regression 12, which controls for multilateral resistance, unobserved
bilateral heterogeneity, and individual PTA trade effects, the APEC's
trade creation estimate drops to 28% (=e
0.244−1).
4. Robustness
In this section we examine whether WTO trade effects are sensitive
to alternative econometric approaches that account for unobserved
bilateralheterogeneityoraccessiondynamics.Sincemostindustrialized
countries joined the WTO early, we also examine whether WTO trade
effects differ for early or late joiners, and whether WTO trade effects
differ across decades.
4.1. Unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and WTO trade effects
Above we hold that a comprehensive approach to addressing both
multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity is
crucial to obtaining unbiased WTO estimates. Instead of the country-
pair ﬁxed effects we employed above, we follow Baier and Bergstrand
(2007)in thissectionandﬁrst-differencethedata.In thisspeciﬁcation
the time-varying importer/exporter dummies can then be interpreted
as the change in multilateral resistance. Regression 13 (Table 3)
establishes a benchmark by adding only country-pair ﬁxed effects to a
simple OLS speciﬁcation with time ﬁxed effects. As expected this
produces qualitatively identical results as the analog ﬁrst-differenced
setup in regression 14. If anything, the country-pair ﬁxed effect
speciﬁcation produces larger WTO trade effects.
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This ﬁnding has three important implications. First, regression 13
shows that there is sufﬁcient power in the data to produce signiﬁcant
WTO trade effects (if such an effect exists), even after 7138 country-
pair ﬁxed effects have been added. Second, either econometric
approach produces highly signiﬁcant and positive WTO membership
effects. This is essentially replicating the TGR result, which showed
that, given Rose's own coding convention, WTO trade effects were
indeed signiﬁcant in the presence of country-pair ﬁxed effects. This
implies our third result, namely that controlling for bilateral
heterogeneity with country-pair ﬁxed effects does not drive our
baseline results in Tables 1a and 2. Instead it is the addition of proper
multilateral resistance controls that negate the inﬂuence of WTO on
bilateral trade ﬂows.
Table 3
Robustness of trade effects. Alternative approaches to control for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity: ﬁrst-differencing and AR(1) errors.
Dependent variable: bilateral imports
Regression # 13 14 15 16 17
Estimation method: CPFE First-differenced First-differenced MLR AR(1) AR(1) & MLR
WTO dummy coding Rose Rose Rose Rose Rose
WTO membership deﬁnition TGR TGR TGR TGR TGR
Number of observations 54,389 40,066 40,935 54,389 54,389
Adj R
2 0.7983 0.1087 0.2770 0.6380 0.7446
Estimated Autocorrelation Coef. 0.5026 0.4576
PTAmxt 0.713*** 0.244*** 0.178*** 0.569*** 0.435***
(0.050) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
GSPmxt (ind. importer grants) −0.189*** −0.039 −0.052 −0.030 −0.153***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.040) (0.022) (0.030)
WTO_Industrialmxt 0.381*** 0.102*** 0.009 0.387*** 0.075*
(0.036) (0.029) (0.060) (0.022) (0.040)
WTO_Developingmxt 0.102*** 0.120*** 0.124* 0.088*** −0.005
(0.029) (0.024) (0.063) (0.018) (0.039)
GDPmt (log of importer GDP) 0.455*** 0.677*** 0.650***
(0.049) (0.060) (0.009)
GDPxt (log of exporter GDP) 0.489*** 0.313*** 0.616***
(0.049) (0.073) (0.009)
GDPpcmt (log of importer GDP per capita) 0.318*** 0.031 0.163***
(0.050) (0.058) (0.014)
GDPpcxt (log of exporter GDP per capita) 0.413*** 0.441*** 0.354***
(0.049) (0.074) (0.013)
Landlockedm (importer is landlocked) −0.477***
(0.034)
Landlockedx (exporter is landlocked) −0.320***
(0.034)
Islandm (importer is island) 0.152***
(0.034)
Islandx (exporter is island) 0.149***
(0.035)
Aream (log of importer land mass) −0.060***
(0.007)
Areax (log of exporter land mass) 0.001
(0.007)
CUmxt (currency union) 0.695*** 0.244** 0.690 0.518*** 0.370***
(0.153) (0.112) (0.630) (0.062) (0.059)
CurrentColonymxt (current colony) 0.517*** 0.249*** 0.950*** 0.539*** 1.219***
(0.156) (0.070) (0.103) (0.105) (0.066)
Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include time ﬁxed effects. Fixed effects results are not reported. MLR indicates
multilateral resistance controls, i.e. time-varying importer and exporter ﬁxed effects. CPFE indicates unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls, i.e. country-pair ﬁxed effects.
14 This is because country-pair ﬁxed effects compare all pre-accession periods to all post-
accession periods. From regression 24 (Table 4), we know that country-pair ﬁxed effects pick
up increases in trade long after accession. First-differences focus only on the difference in
trade in the period right after accession compared to the period right before accession.
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multilateral resistance to the ﬁrst-differenced speciﬁcation to obtain
regression 15. This is the ﬁrst-differenced analog of regression 10
(Table 2) and again, WTO trade effects disappear only when multilateral
resistance is added. Only a weak, marginally signiﬁcant WTO effect
remains for developing countries. An alternative approach is to allow for
AR(1)errortermstocontrolforbilateralheterogeneity.Oncemultilateral
resistance is added, WTO trade effects largely vanish here as well
(regression 17). This time, it is a weak industrialized country WTO effect
thatremainsmarginallysigniﬁcantatthe10%level.Ourotherrobustness
tables below conﬁrm that the WTO effect always vanishes largely
because of the introduction of multilateral resistance controls.
4.2. WTO accession dynamics
Table 4 examines whether much of the growth in bilateral trade
occurredpriortoactualWTOaccession,perhapsbecausecountrieswith
high trade growth were more likely to enter the WTO, or because the
simple announcement of future WTO accession caused an increase in
bilateral trade. The accession dynamics allow us to pick up the pre and
postaccession changes in bilateral trade,althoughour results in Table 4
cannot address causality. Again, while country-pair ﬁxed effects leave
the WTO effect largely intact, it is eliminated by the introduction of
multilateral resistance controls. Once again, our preferred three-way
regression 21 shows no signiﬁcant effect of WTO membership on trade
growth either pre-accession or during WTO membership.
4.3. Variations in WTO trade effects over time
There is a possibility that the WTO coefﬁcient's lack ofsigniﬁcance is
due to large variations in WTO accession experiences over time, where
someeffects may have been offsetting. Tangand Wei (2009) attempt to
ﬁnessethisissuebyfocusingonlyonspeciﬁctimeperiodscharacterized
by a ﬂurry of WTO accessions, for example the 1990s. Table 5 addresses
the issue by reporting separate WTO coefﬁcients for each decade.
Results are provided for each estimation strategy: OLS, multilateral
resistance,country-pairﬁxedeffects,andourpreferred three-wayﬁxed
effectsapproach.Ourbaselineresultsareconﬁrmedforeachdecade.For
each time period, the three-way ﬁxed effect approach (column 4)
eliminates any signiﬁcant trade effect of WTO membership. Columns 2
and 3 demonstrate that country-pair ﬁxed effects do not sufﬁce to
eliminate the WTO effect in most instances. Instead, the WTO effect is
again negated by the multilateral resistance controls.
4.4. WTO trade effects for industrialized early joiners
Another potential problem that is associated with the particular
timing of WTO accessions relates to industrialized countries. The WTO
trade effects of 15 of 23 industrialized countries are omitted from the
analysiswhencountry-pair ﬁxed effectsare introduced, becausethese
countries joined GATT/WTO before the start of our dataset in 1950.
15
Trade between the United States and the United Kingdom might have
been higher on average over the period 1950–2000, because both
countries were GATT/WTO members from 1948 onward, but this
effect is absorbed by the country-ﬁxed effect between them. Omission
of industrialized early joiners in the estimation of the aggregate WTO
effect is problematic in view of the terms-of-trade theory, which will
be described in more detail in Section 5.3. The theory holds that larger
countries with market power have the largest incentives to negotiate
tariff reductions upon WTO accession and thus may also reap the
largest trade gains.
Regression 22a (Table 5) provides evidence in favor of the theory's
prediction. It shows substantial and signiﬁcant increases in trade for
the subset of industrialized country pairs that joined the WTO prior to
1950. The OLS coefﬁcient for these pre-1950 WTO members is
signiﬁcantly larger and the standard error remarkably lower than for
the full sample. Once multilateral resistance is introduced, the full
sample shows no WTO trade effects, but these pre-1950 WTO
members show statistically and economically signiﬁcant trade
creation. This is a notable feat given that multilateral resistance
controls eliminated WTO trade effects in virtually all other speciﬁca-
tions. Thus, there may be reason to believe that the multilateral
trading system indeed boosted trade among these industrialized early
joiners. Note, however, that since regression 22a cannot include both
country-pair ﬁxed effects and a WTO dummy, a caveat necessarily
remains.Wecannotidentifywhetherthehighertradeamongthese15
industrialized nations is indeed due to WTO membership or due to an
unobserved trade-enhancing characteristic among them.
5. In search of WTO trade effects: extending the uniﬁed framework
Taken together with the strong PTA trade creation from before,
these results on industrialized early joiners raise the suspicion that
WTO membership may raise tradein moresubtle ways than identiﬁed
by our basic uniﬁed framework. In search of more subtle WTO trade
effects, this section presents two extensions to our framework. The
ﬁrst extension sets out a gravity model speciﬁcally suited to
disentangling overlapping PTA and WTO membership. It is then
used to investigate whether WTO may have fostered trade regionally,
along lines of future PTAs or more generally. We ﬁnd evidence that
WTO membership may underpin regional trade integration among
developing countries and in the run-up to PTA formation. The second
extension incorporates proxies for the terms-of-trade theory, for
which we ﬁnd support in the data. Our results imply that those
countries that had substantial incentives to negotiate tariff reductions
during their WTO accession negotiations also exhibit signiﬁcantly
larger and positive WTO trade effects than other members.
5.1. Disentangling WTO and PTA trade effects
AboveweassumedthatthechoiceofbeinginaPTAand/ortheWTO
is independent. In this section we explore how PTA and WTO




Accession dynamics and WTO trade effects. (Only WTO coefﬁcients reported.)
Dependent variable: bilateral imports
Regression # 18 19 20 21
Estimation method OLS MLR CPFE MLR & CPFE
WTO dummy coding Rose Rose Rose Rose
WTO membership deﬁnition TGR TGR TGR TGR
N 54,389 55,831 54,389 55,831
Adj R
2 0.6419 0.7400 0.7977 0.8370
PTAmxt 0.860*** 0.658*** 0.735*** 0.533***
(0.051) (0.062) (0.051) (0.049)
WTO/GSPmx,t−1 0.038 0.057* 0.054** 0.014
(0.026) (0.032) (0.024) (0.033)
WTO/GSPmx, t 0.224*** 0.058 0.125*** −0.009
(0.032) (0.040) (0.027) (0.035)
WTO/GSPmx, [t+1,n) 0.281*** 0.002 0.306*** −0.048
(0.031) (0.055) (0.037) (0.053)
Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Results are based on Table 2 regression speciﬁcations with a single WTO/GSP dummy.
WTO/GSP is then disaggregated as follows: “t−1” denotes the panel 5 years prior to
WTO accession and “t+1” indicates 5 years post WTO accession. Full results can be
obtained from the authors upon request.
15 See Table A3 in Eicher and Henn (2008).
16 The idea for this section was suggested to us by Robert Staiger.
146 T.S. Eicher, C. Henn / Journal of International Economics 83 (2011) 137–153casethatwewerenotabletoﬁndWTOtradeeffectsbecauseofthebasic
gravitymodel'sinabilitytodisentanglethedifferentimpacts.Toaddress
this concern, this section's extended gravity model explicitly allows
bilateral trade ﬂows to be determined by interactions of PTA and WTO
membership.
Suppose country-pair, (m, x), consists of WTO members that
decide to join a common PTA. We would expect the impact of PTA
membership oncountry m's imports from country x to be smallerthan
for two non-WTO members that join a common PTA. This statement is
true, ceteris paribus, if the additional margin of preference implied by
the PTA is lower for WTO members (whose MFN tariffs have
presumably been negotiated to low levels) than for non-WTO
members. At the same time, we would expect that the WTO impact
on country m's imports from country x is positive only if the countries
are not partners in a free-trade agreement. This statement is true
except in the unusual case where the PTA involves a smaller margin of
preference than WTO membership.
17 We test these two hypotheses
by simplifying the WTO dummies in Eq. (2′) into one aggregate term
and by augmenting the empirical framework with a WTO/PTA
interaction term.
18






+ β6CurrencyColonymxt + εmxt:
ð3Þ
The interpretation of the parameters in Eq. (3) is as follows: β1 is
the impact of PTAs on trade ﬂows for non-WTO members, β3 is the
WTO impact on trade ﬂows for trading partners that do not belong to
thesamePTA,andβ1+β2representtheimpactofPTAmembershipon
trade for WTO members. We expect β1+β2N0 as per the discussion
above,andbythesamereasoningweexpectβ1+β2tobesmallerthan
β1, because PTA-induced liberalization should be smaller if WTO
liberalization has already been undertaken. Likewise, β2+β3 is the
effectofWTOmembershipfortradingpartnersthatbelongtothesame
PTA. In this case we expect β2+β3b0 since the new WTO bindings
create incentives to import from non-PTA partners.
Table 6 reports the results from Eq. (3). While it delivers more
structured insights into the mechanics of the WTO trade effects, it
nevertheless broadly conﬁrms our previous results. To economize on
space, only the preferred three-way ﬁxed effects results are reported,
which include controls for multilateral resistance, unobserved
country-pair heterogeneity, and time ﬁxed effects. Regression 30
indicates that joining a PTA for WTO non-members doubles trade
ﬂows among trading partners (e
0.694−1=100%). As expected, a
smaller, but highly statistically signiﬁcant 70% (=e
0.522−1) increase
in trade is generated when WTO members join a PTA. In contrast,
joining the WTO for PTA members or non-members has no
statistically signiﬁcant effect on trade ﬂows. This conﬁrms the general
pattern we have observed throughout the paper, namely that large
trade creation is generated by PTAs while WTO membership seems to
have a weak impact on trade ﬂows.
SW, Rose, and our results above lead us to suspect that PTA and
WTO trade effects may be heterogeneous, depending on the types of
countries that join PTAs or the WTO. This hypothesis is examined in
regression 31, which disaggregates the WTO variable into industrial-
ized, developing, and GSP-granting importers. While the lack of WTO
trade effects is robust for industrial and developing importers, regres-
sion31doesproducetheexpecteddeclineintrade(e
−0.483−1=−38%)
for a small subset of trading partners that a) are members in a PTA, b)
enter the WTO, and c) contain an industrialized importer extending
GSP. The result is intuitive in a world of factor endowment driven
trade (relevant exactly for industrialized/developing trading relation-
ships), where the margin of preference implied by the PTA is higher for
non-WTO members than for WTO members. WTO accession would
lead to a greater reallocation of trade to non-PTA partners. The trade-
enhancing effect of entering a PTA is conﬁrmed and statistically
signiﬁcant for industrialized, developing, and industrialized GSP-
granting nations. However, the effect is twice as large for developing
countries (110%=e
0.740−1) as for industrialized (52%=e
0.420−1), or
GSP granting importers (55%=e
0.438−1).
17 APEC might be a case in point, because it never actually instituted tariff reductions
among member countries.
18 We report results only for the most comprehensive ﬁxed effects and Rose's
conventional coding methodology. Results are similar for alternative ﬁxed effects
speciﬁcations; they can be obtained from the authors upon request.
Table 5
WTO trade effect across time. (Only WTO coefﬁcients reported.)
Regr.# Sample period WTO membership Estimation method
OLS CPFE MLR MLR & CPFE
22 1950–2000 All 0.213*** 0.172*** −0.058 −0.067
(0.270) (0.027) (0.049) (0.048)
22a 1950–2000 Early joiners 1950
a 0.467*** na 0.240*** na
(0.081) (0.073)
22b 1950–2000 No early joiners 1950 0.197*** 0.190*** −0.051 −0.065
(0.270) (0.027) (0.498) (0.049)
23 1950–60 All 0.401*** 0.253*** 0.015 −0.020
(0.050) (0.076) (0.088) (0.110)
24 1960–70 All 0.236*** 0.086* −0.002 0.024
(0.040) (0.051) (0.082) (0.119)
25 1970–80 All 0.102*** 0.078 −0.059 −0.036
(0.038) (0.058) (0.075) (0.090)
26 1980–90 All 0.019 0.012 −0.137* −0.087
(0.039) (0.057) (0.078) (0.094)
27 1990–2000 All 0.319*** 0.056 0.077 −0.003
(0.035) (0.051) (0.080) (0.104)
28 1950–75 All 0.252*** 0.096*** −0.034 −0.020
(0.035) (0.036) (0.061) (0.061)
29 1975–2000 All 0.177*** 0.150*** −0.046 −0.021
(0.031) (0.036) (0.063) (0.067)
Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. Results are based on Table 2 regression speciﬁcations with a single WTO/GSP dummy. Full results
are available from the authors. The dependent variable in all regressions is bilateral imports. WTO membership deﬁnition is TGR.
a This dummy variable is one for pairs of industrialized countries that joined the WTO in or before 1950 and zero otherwise.
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The steady reduction of transport costs over the time period
covered by our dataset suggests less regionalization of trade. In
contrast, market size effects can lower trade costs sufﬁciently to boost
regionalbutnotdistanttrade(seeBaldwin,2008).WTOaccessionmay
thus exert asymmetric effects on proximate/distant trade. Many of
these effects are already addressed by multilateral resistance and
Table 6
Does PTA membership or distance modify WTO trade effects?
Dependent variable: bilateral imports
Regression # 30 31 30a 31a 32 33
N 55,831 55,831 55,831 55,831 55,831 55,831
Adj R
2 0.8370 0.8373 0.8371 0.8374 0.8374 0.8380
Impact of PTAs on trade ﬂows for trading partners that are non-WTO members (β1)
PTAmxt 0.694*** 0.714*** 0.722*** 0.753*** 0.861***





Impact of PTA membership on trade ﬂows for trading partners in WTO (β1+β2)
a
All countries 0.522*** 0.573*** 0.441***
(0.048) (0.080) (0.046)
Industrialized importers 0.420*** 0.386*** 0.372***
(0.063) (0.097) (0.062)
Developing importers 0.740*** 0.823*** 0.581***
(0.082) (0.102) (0.080)
Industrialized importers granting GSP 0.438** 0.525** 0.025
(0.198) (0.210) (0.319)
Impact of WTO membership on trade ﬂows for trading partners that share the same PTA (β2+β3)
a
All countries −0.239 −0.222 1.081***
(0.152) (0.152) (0.237)
Industrialized importers −0.259 −0.326* 0.771*
(0.187) (0.191) (0.421)
Developing importers −0.059 −0.028 1.725***
(0.165) (0.167) (0.273)
Industrialized importers granting GSP −0.483*** −0.436*** 0.041
(0.117) (0.121) (0.347)
Impact of WTO on trade ﬂows for trading partners that do not share same PTA (β3)
All countries −0.067 −0.073 1.501***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.232)
Industrialized importers 0.036 0.041 0.665**
(0.072) (0.074) (0.300)
Developing importers −0.085 −0.098 2.152***
(0.071) (0.072) (0.272)
Industrialized importers granting GSP −0.208*** −0.209*** 0.282
(0.045) (0.047) (0.354)
WTO interactions with contemporaneous PTA dummy (β2)
WTO/GSP mxt⁎PTAmxt −0.172 −0.149 −0.420***
(0.143) (0.144) (0.155)
WTO_Industrialmxt⁎PTAmxt −0.294* −0.367** 0.106
(0.168) (0.177) (0.312)
WTO_Developingmxt⁎PTAmxt 0.026 0.070 −0.427**
(0.146) (0.148) (0.168)
GSPmxt⁎PTAmxt −0.276** −0.228* −0.241**
(0.119) (0.127) (0.118)








Industrialized importers granting GSP −0.212**
(0.090)









Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include all appropriate covariates (as in Table 2) and higher order interactions. WTO
interactions with the future PTA membership dummy, β4, are omitted for space reasons. Full results are available upon request from the authors. All regressions feature country-pair
ﬁxed effects (CPFE), multilateral resistance (MLR), and TGR WTO membership deﬁnition.
a Indicates composite coefﬁcients calculated using Delta method (Greene, 2003).
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only for average bilateral effects over the entire sample period and
they might not capture time-varying effects, especially after trading
partners enter the WTO. In addition, it may also be the case that WTO
membership increased regional trade particularly for countries that
eventually form PTAs. In this case, some WTO trade effects may be
falsely picked up by PTA coefﬁcients.
To investigate whether WTO trade effects are regional, we add a
dummytoEq.(3)toidentifytradingpartnersthatarea)currentlyinthe
WTO,and b) joinacommonPTAinthefuture.Theresults arepresented
in regressions 30a and 31a (Table 6). Again, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
effect: WTO members' trade with future PTA partners did not increase
soon after WTO accession. Alternatively, we also investigate whether
WTOmembershipincreasestradeamongPTApartners-to-beovertime.
Todoso, we splitthe PTAregressor into dummies that indicate thepre-
PTA accession period, (t−1),t h eP T Aa c c e s s i o np e r i o d ,( t), and all
subsequent periods, [t+1, n). Results are reported in Table 7,w h e r e





0.360−1) in the accession period, and 121% (=e
0.794−1) post-
accession. Not only the economic signiﬁcance, but also the statistical
signiﬁcance increases over time. When WTO/PTA interactions are
included again (regression 31b), we ﬁnd that only WTO members
experience a signiﬁcant PTA pre-accession effect of 11% (=e
0.106−1).
The corresponding effect for non-WTO members, albeit similar in
magnitude, remains insigniﬁcant. Therefore, joint WTO membership
may facilitate the formation of PTAs. As expected, post-accession trade
effects in PTAs between WTO members remain lower than in PTAs
between WTO non-members.
19
Finally, WTO trade creation may also have fostered regional trade
integration irrespective of current or future PTA membership. To
explorethis possibility, regression32 (Table 6) examinesthe effects of
distanceonthemagnitudeofWTOtradecreation.Thebasicresults are
largely similar to those in regression 30, where the impact of PTAs on
trade ﬂows was strong for WTO member or non-member countries.
Once we allow WTO trade effects to vary with distance, we ﬁnd two
important new effects: the WTO coefﬁcient is now statistically
signiﬁcant at 0.861 and 1.501 for PTA and Non-PTA members,
respectively, but these effects are moderated by distance. The
interaction between distance and WTO produces a negative signiﬁ-
cant coefﬁcient of −0.191, indicating that the positive effect of WTO
membership on trade declines with distance. We can trace the WTO
trade effect for PTA members and non-members in Figs. 1 and 2. For
PTA members, Fig. 1a indicates an insigniﬁcant WTO effect through-
out, while WTO members that do not belong to a PTA exhibit positive
and statistically signiﬁcant WTO trade effects up to 1500 miles. These
effects turn negative and statistically signiﬁcant beyond 4000 miles.
Thus there is strong evidence that WTO membership creates
proximate trade incentives for non-PTA countries, but at least
partially at the expense of distant trade. Our insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients
Table 7
WTO inﬂuence on PTA accession dynamics.
Dependent variable: bilateral imports
Regression # 30b 31b 30c 31c










N 55,831 55,831 40,925 40,925
Adj R
2 0.8373 0.8373 0.2773 0.2774
Impact of PTAs on trade ﬂows for trading partners that are not WTO members (β1)
PTAmx,t−1 0.112** 0.193 0.099*** 0.179
(0.046) (0.151) (0.037) (0.139)
PTAmx,t 0.360*** 0.309* 0.289*** 0.012
(0.053) (0.184) (0.049) (0.181)
PTAmx, [t+1,n ) 0.794*** 1.118*** 0.515*** 0.403***
(0.067) (0.150) (0.061) (0.157)
Impact of WTO on trade ﬂows for trading partners that do not share same PTA (β3)
WTO/GSPmxt −0.061 −0.060 0.077* 0.078*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.040) (0.040)































Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
a Indicates composite coefﬁcients were calculated using the Delta method (Greene,
2003). Regressions based on speciﬁcations in Table 2. The regressions also include all
appropriate higher order interactions involving PTA/WTO&GSP/distance. Full results
are available upon request from the authors. All regressions feature country-pair ﬁxed
effects (CPFE), multilateral resistance (MLR), and TGR WTO membership deﬁnition.
19 In regression 31b, the 206 percent (=e
1.118−1) post-accession PTA effect for WTO
non-members is about twice as large as the 116 % (=e
0.771−1) increase in PTA
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Average WTO effect for PTA members
Fig. 1. Variation with distance of overall WTO effect. The ﬁgures are based on composite
coefﬁcient estimates derived from Table 6. Dashed lines represent 95% conﬁdence bands.
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(negative) effects for proximate (distant) trading partners.
In regression 33 we again disaggregate the WTO variable into
individual WTO trade effects for industrialized GSP and developing
importers (Fig. 2). The ﬁgures generally do not show positive and
statistically signiﬁcant WTO trade effects. The exception is the case of
developing country importers that are not PTA members (Fig. 2,b o t t o m
right). For these countries, WTO accession generates positive and
signiﬁcant trade beneﬁts with proximate partners (b1750 miles) at the
cost of signiﬁcant negative effects with distant trading partners (N4250
miles).
5.3. Variations in WTO trade effects according to terms-of-trade theory
Strict economic interpretations of Rose's, SW's, or our ﬁndings can
bedifﬁcultat timesbecausethebasicgravitymodeldoesnotprovidea
speciﬁc theoretical framework to analyze WTO trade effects. Bagwell
and Staiger (2010) suggest that the absence of theoretical guidance,
which speciﬁcally addresses WTO effects on trade, calls into question
whether the Rose/SW gravity approach can claim to provide a
comprehensive assessment of WTO trade effects. In this section we
augmentthegravitymodeltoproxyforeffectssuggestedbytheterms-
of-trade theory, which has been speciﬁcally designed to analyze the
effects of WTO membership.
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) put forth a terms-of-trade-theory of
GATT which ﬁnds WTO membership particularly useful for govern-
ments that seek to escape a terms-of-trade-driven prisoners'
dilemma. The notion is that large countries with market power and
the ability to inﬂuence world prices will do so through trade barriers
that move the terms of trade in their favor. The resulting retaliation
from other large countries then generates the terms-of-trade prison-
er's dilemma. Since larger countries have greater incentives to
attempt to change the terms of trade in their favor, terms-of-trade
theory suggests that the magnitude of negotiated tariff reductions
prior to WTO accession is larger for such countries. Larger tariff
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Fig. 2. Variation with distance of country group speciﬁc WTO effects. The ﬁgures are based on composite coefﬁcient estimates derived from Table 6. Dashed lines represent 95%
conﬁdence bands.
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(2008), who focus on market power, and by Bagwell and Staiger
(forthcoming) import volumes. Bagwell and Staiger show that the
terms-of-trade theory implies that negotiated tariff reductions at WTO
accession increase (i) the larger the country's ability to alter foreign
exporter prices, (ii) the larger the country's pre-negotiation import
volume, and (iii) the smaller the rate at which the costs of protection-
induced domestic distortions rise as tariffs rise. Using data on WTO
accession negotiations in a panel of 16 countries from 1995 to 2005,
Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming) show that terms-of-trade theory is
consistent with observed patterns of negotiated tariff concessions.
Speciﬁcally, the authors derive an econometric model that suggests the
international cost-shifting incentives increase with a country's import
volume. Accordingly, the larger a country's Nash import volume, the
greater should be its incentive to negotiate tariff cut at WTO accession.
The key insight from Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming) is that
country characteristics affect accession negotiations, tariff concessions,
and hence the subsequent trade gains that can be generated by WTO
membership. Their data clearly show that for recent WTO accession
countries, greater import volumes were associated with larger tariff cuts,
which should then generate larger trade gains. Following Bagwell and
Staiger (2010), we focus on import volumes as a proxy for the gains a
country may reap from liberalization. Speciﬁcally, we attempt to discern
whether countries with higher import volumes in their WTO accession
year possessed greater terms-of-trade incentives to negotiate tariff
reductions, which then generated larger subsequent trade gains. Table 8
reports that WTO trade effects indeed increase with trade volumes at
accession, suggestingthatcountries withlarger import volumes (relative
to world trade) negotiated larger tariff reductions at accession.
ResultsinTable8areobtainedbyaugmentingaregressionspeciﬁedby
Eq.(2′)withanadditional dummythat indicateswhether acountryranks
aboveaspeciﬁcimportvolumethresholdatthetimeofWTOaccession.As
we vary the threshold from the 66th to the 95th percentiles, we ﬁnd that
those countries which rank below the 66th percentile in import volumes
never experience positive WTO trade effects. WTO trade effects turn
positive and signiﬁcantly different from the rest of the sample for
countries that rank above the 85th percentile in imports relative to world
trade. The trade effects increase in magnitude and signiﬁcance until the
90th and 95th percentiles, at which point not only the marginal, but also
the aggregate WTO trade effects are positive and signiﬁcant. The results
imply a 17% (=e
0.162−1) trade increase due to WTO membership for
countries in the highest import percentiles. This WTO trade effect is not as
l a r g ea ss o m eo ft h eP T At r a d ee f f e c t sw ef o u n di nTable 2.W h e n
comparing magnitudes it must be considered, however, that PTA trade
effects include industrialized countries, while the WTO trade effects in
Table8excludetradeeffectsgeneratedbyindustrializedcountrypairsthat
joined prior to 1950.
20 Since exactly this set of countries had presumably
t h eg r e a t e s tt e r m so ft r a d ee x t e r n a l i t i e s ,i ti sa l lt h em o r er e m a r k a b l et h a t
we can establish the pattern of WTO trade gains suggested by terms-of-
trade theory among the set of remaining countries.




that the tariff concessions increased dramatically for countries whose
import quantities exceeded the 90th percentile. We observe a similar
effect in Table 8 in terms of magnitudes of WTO trade gains in our
sample of 177 countries over 50 years. However, our effect relates to
post-WTO accession import gains rather than tariff concessions at WTO
accession. Presumably these import gains were generated by corre-
spondingly larger tariff concessions at accession.
Table 8
Using terms of trade theory to identify WTO trade effects. WTO induced trade gains by country-import rank in WTO accession year.
Dependent variable: bilateral imports
Regression # 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Estimation method MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE MLR & CPFE
WTO dummy coding Rose Rose Rose Rose Rose Rose Rose
WTO membership deﬁnition De jure De jure De jure De jure De jure De jure De jure
N 55,831 55,831 55,831 55,831 55,831 55,831 55,831
Adj R
2 0.8383 0.8383 0.8383 0.8383 0.8383 0.8383 0.8383
WTO/GSPmxt −0.001 −0.017 −0.019 −0.018 −0.028 −0.014 −0.007






















PTAsmxt (individual PTAs?) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Composite of both WTO effects
b 0.014 0.034 0.042 0.049 0.084 0.107* 0.155**
(0.044) (0.047) (0.048) (.050) (0.052) (0.060) (0.074)
Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parenthesis. Regressions based on Table 2 speciﬁcations. Full results are available upon request from the authors.
a Imports_x% is a dummy that identiﬁes countries whose importsjt/(world_importst) exceed the x
th percentile (where t is the year of country j's accession to the GATT/WTO). The
percentile rankings are generated as follows: First, we obtain the ratio of country importsjt over world_importst from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Second, countries acceding
WTO in year t are then percentile-ranked relative to all other countries in year t. (Results are just about identical when establish a simple percentile ranking of all accession year
ratios.) Data availability required that some WTO accession countries had to be ranked based on a post WTO accession year data: Bangladesh 1973 (1972), Bermuda 1958 (1948),
Comoros 1969 (1948), Dem. Rep. of Congo 1972 (1971), Kuwait 1973 (1963), and Seychelles 1970 (1963), where the formal accession year is provided in the parentheses. Antigua
and Barbuda and South Africa had to be omitted due to missing data.
b Composite coefﬁcients calculated using the Delta method (Greene, 2003).
20 See the discussion in Section 4.4 of Table 5, regressions 22a and 22b.
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Regression # A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9
Dependent variable Avg. trade Imports Imports Avg. trade Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports
WTO dummy coding Rose Rose Rose SW SW SW Rose Rose SW
WTO membership deﬁnition De jure De jure TGR De jure De jure TGR De jure TGR TGR
N 54,389 54,389 54,389 54,389 54,389 54,389 54,389 54,389 54,389
Adj R
2 0.6946 0.6398 0.6411 0.6946 0.6399 0.6410 0.6422 0.6431 0.6436
PTAmxt 0.801*** 0.877*** 0.865*** 0.801*** 0.863*** 0.855*** 0.840*** 0.833*** 1.169***
(0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056)
WTO/GSP 0.044* 0.103*** 0.213*** 0.045* 0.129*** 0.243***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027)
GSPmxt 0.065* 0.053 0.661***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.053)
WTO_Indmxt 0.278*** 0.379*** 1.034***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.054)
WTO_Devmxt −0.089*** 0.044 0.006
(0.027) (0.029) (0.036)
Notes: *,**, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errorsin parenthesis. Fixed effect coefﬁcients are suppressed. All regressionsinclude time ﬁxed effects. Dueto SW's coding
convention, PTA and GSP effects are calculated according to footnote 14. Average Trade data is obtained from Rose (2004). As speciﬁed in the text, these regressions also include Log
of importer GDP, Log of exporter GDP, Log of importer GDP per capita, Log of exporter GDP per capita, importer is Landlocked, exporter is Landlocked, importer is Island, exporter is
Island, log of importer land mass, log of exporter land mass, currency union, current colony, ever colony, common colonizer, common language, same nation, common border, log of
distance. Full results are available upon request from the authors.
6. Conclusion
This paper reexamines the effects of WTO membership on bilateral
trade ﬂows. First we show that a number of previous approaches can
be combined into one uniﬁed framework. This framework controls
comprehensively for omitted variable bias in three dimensions:
individual PTA effects, multilateral resistance, and unobserved
bilateral heterogeneity. Our results show that all previous approaches
(Rose, 2004, 2005; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; and Tomz et al.,
2007) produce the result that WTO membership does not generate
statistically signiﬁcant trade effects. The analysis highlights that the
diverging and conﬂicting results regarding WTO trade effects in the
literature were generated by omitted variable bias.
In contrast, we ﬁnd that PTAs create trade strongly, but unevenly
across individual agreements. The magnitude of our individual PTA
estimates resolves a number of empirical puzzles. Most notably, the
non-tariff reducing APEC is shown to exert comparatively little trade
impact, and the strongly tariff-reducing EU is shown to be trade
creating. Trade theory motivates the inclusion of comprehensive
multilateral resistance controls to pick up variations in relative trade
costs.These controls are shown to be insufﬁcientto generate unbiased
estimates of trade agreements' impacts on trade ﬂows. Of crucial
importance are also country-pair ﬁxed effects that control for
unobserved bilateral characteristics.
In two extensions of the gravity model that account for speciﬁc
ways in which theory suggests WTO trade creation, we ﬁnd positive
and signiﬁcant trade effects. Our ﬁrst extension disentangles over-
lapping WTO and PTA membership effects. We ﬁnd that WTO
membership increases trade effects just before PTA accession. In
addition, WTO membership fosters regional trade integration among
developing country members at the expense of more distant trade.
Our second extension augments the gravity model with proxies for
the WTO terms-of-trade theory. Here we ﬁnd that countries with
greater incentives to bargain for tariff reductions during WTO
accession negotiations exhibit positive and signiﬁcant WTO trade
effects.
Appendix A
152 T.S. Eicher, C. Henn / Journal of International Economics 83 (2011) 137–153References
Aitken, N.D., 1973. The effect of the EEC and EFTA on European trade: a temporal cross-
section analysis. American Economic Review 63 (5), 881–892.
Anderson, J., van Wincoop, E., 2003. Gravity with Gravitas: a solution to the border
puzzle. American Economic Review 93 (1), 170–192.
Bagwell, K., Staiger, R.W., 1999. An economic theory of GATT. American Economic
Review 89 (1), 215–248.
Bagwell, K., Staiger, R.W., 2002. The Economics of the World Trading System. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Bagwell, K., Staiger, R.W., 2010. The WTO: theory and practice. Annual Review of
Economics 2, 223–256.
Bagwell, K., Staiger, R.W., forthcoming. What do trade negotiators negotiate about?
Empirical evidence from the World Trade Organization. American Economic
Review.
Baier, S.L., Bergstrand, J.H., 2007. Do free trade agreements actually increase members'
international trade? Journal of International Economics 71, 72–95.
Baldwin, R., 2008. Big-think regionalism: a critical survey. NBER 14056.
Baldwin, R., Taglioni, D., 2006. Gravity for dummies and dummies for gravity equations.
NBER Working Paper 12516.
Baltagi, B.H., Egger, P., Michael Pfaffermayr, M., 2003. A generalized design for bilateral
trade ﬂow models. Economic Letters 80, 391–397.
Broda, Christian, Limao, Nuno, Weinstein, David E., 2008. Optimal tariffs and market
power: the evidence. American Economic Review 98 (5), 2032–2065.
Cheng, I., Wall, H.J., 2005. Controlling for heterogeneity in gravity models of trade and
integration. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 87 (1), 49–63.
Egger, P., 2000. A note on the proper econometric speciﬁcation of the gravity equation.
Economics Letters 66, 25–31.
Egger, P., Pfaffermayr, M., 2003. The proper panel econometric speciﬁcation of the
gravity equation: a three-way model with bilateral interaction effects. Empirical
Economics 28, 571–580.
Eicher, T.S., Henn, C., 2008. Preferential Trade Agreements Promote Trade Strongly, But
Unevenly. University of Washington working paper.
Eicher, T. S., Henn, C., Papageorgiou, C., 2010. “Trade Creation and Diversion Revisited:
Accounting for Model Uncertainty and Unobserved bilateral heterogeneity”.
Journal of Applied Econometrics, forthcoming.
Frankel, J., 1992. Is Japan creating a yen bloc in East Asia and the Paciﬁc? NBER 4050.
Frankel, J., 1997. Preferential Trading Blocs in the World Trading System. Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C.
Frankel, J., Wei, S.J., 1993. Trading blocs and currency blocs. NBER Working Paper 4335.
Frankel, J., Stein, E., Wei, S.J., 1995. Trading blocs and the Americas: the natural, the
unnatural and the supernatural? Journal of Development Economics 47, 61–95.
Freund, C., 2000. Different paths from free trade: the gains from regionalism. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 1317–1341.
Glick, R., Rose, A.K., 2002. Does a currency union affect trade? The time-series evidence.
European Economic Review 46, 1125–1151.
Greene, W.H., 2003. Econometric Analysis, 5th Edition. Prentice-Hall, Princeton, NJ.
Hausman, J.A., Taylor, W.E., 1981. Panel data and unobservable individual effects.
Econometrica 49 (6), 1377–1398.
Hsiao, C., 1986. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, H., 1953-4. Optimum tariffs and retaliation. Review of Economic Studies 21 (2),
142–153.
Melitz, M., 2003. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity. Econometrica 71 (6), 1695–1725.
Rose, A.K., 2000. One money, one market? The effects of common currencies on
international trade. Economic Policy 15, 7–46.
Rose, A.K., 2004. Do we really know that the WTO increases trade? American Economic
Review 13 (4), 682–698.
Rose, A.K., 2005. Which international institutions promote trade? Review of
International Economics 13 (4), 682–698.
Subramanian, A., Wei, S.J., 2007. The WTO promotes trade strongly, but unevenly.
Journal of International Economics 72 (1), 151–175.
Tang, M.-K., Wei, S.-J., 2009. The value of making commitments externally: evidence
from WTO accessions. Journal of International Economics 78 (2), 216–229.
Tomz, M., Goldstein, J.L., Rivers, D., 2007. Do we really know that the WTO increases
trade? Comment. American Economic Review 97 (5), 2005–2018.
153 T.S. Eicher, C. Henn / Journal of International Economics 83 (2011) 137–153